Handbook of the Economics of Innovation

Author： Hall, Bronwyn H.;Rosenberg, Nathan

Publishers： Elsevier Science

Publishing year： 2010

ISBN： 9780080931111

Subject： [F0 经济学]

Language： ENG

Introduction

Economists examine the genesis of technological change and the ways we commercialize and diffuse it. The economics of property rights and patents, in addition to industry applications, are also surveyed through literature reviews and predictions about fruitful research directions.

Two volumes, available as a set or sold separately

  • Expert articles consider the best ways to establish optimal incentives in technological progress
  • Science and innovation, both their theories and applications, are examined at the intersections of the marketplace, policy, and social welfare
  • Economists are only part of an audience that includes attorneys, educators, and anyone involved in new technologies

Chapter

  • Front Cover

  • Handbook of The Economics of Innovation

  • Copyright Page

  • Introduction to the Series

  • Contents of the Handbook

  • Part I: Introduction and Overview

  • Chapter 1: Introduction to the Handbook

  • Acknowledgments

  • References

  • Chapter 2: The Contribution of Economic History to the Study of Innovation and Technical Change: 1750-1914

  • 1. Introduction: Technology and economic modernity

  • 2. Technology in a ``Malthusian economy´´

  • 3. The first Industrial Revolution: A new approach

  • 4. The transition to modern growth, 1830-1880

  • 5. The second Industrial Revolution

  • 6. A suggested interpretation

  • References

  • Chapter 3: Technical Change and Industrial Dynamics as Evolutionary Processes

  • 1. Introduction

  • 2. On the nature of ``technology´´

  • 2.1. Technology and information

  • 2.2. Technologies as recipes

  • 2.3. Technologies as routines

  • 2.4. Technologies as artifacts

  • 2.5. Knowledge, procedures, and input/output relations

  • 3. How technologies evolve

  • 3.1. Technological paradigms and technological trajectories

  • 3.2. Technological opportunities, the processes of knowledge accumulation, and their cumulativeness

  • 3.3. Demand and other socioeconomic factors shaping the direction of technological advance

  • 3.4. Means of appropriation

  • 3.5. Technological advance and the theory of the firm

  • 3.6. The dynamic of productive knowledge, and the dynamics of production coefficients

  • 3.7. Technological regimes: Sectoral specificities in patterns of technological advance, and the characteristics of innovative actors

  • 3.8. Formal models of search and technological evolution

  • 3.9. Invention, innovation, and diffusion

  • 3.10. The path dependence of the processes of technological evolution

  • 4. Schumpeterian competition and industrial dynamics

  • 4.1. Microeconomic heterogeneity: Size, to begin with

  • 4.2. Corporate growth rates and corporate profitabilities

  • 4.3. Behind heterogeneous performances: Innovation and production efficiency

  • 4.4. Corporate capabilities, competition, and industrial change

  • 4.5. Industry-specific dynamics and industry life cycles

  • 4.6. Models of industrial dynamics

  • 5. Innovation, industrial evolution, and economic growth: Some conclusions

  • Acknowledgments

  • References

  • Chapter 4: Fifty Years of Empirical Studies of Innovative Activity and Performance

  • 1. Introduction

  • 2. Empirical studies in the Schumpeterian tradition

  • 2.1. Firm size and innovation

  • 2.2. Monopoly and innovation

  • 2.2.1. Market structure, innovation, and industry dynamics

  • 2.3. Evaluation of empirical research in the Schumpeterian tradition

  • 2.3.1. Firm size and innovation

  • 2.3.2. Market structure and innovation

  • 2.3.3. Crosscutting considerations

  • 3. Firm characteristics

  • 4. Industry characteristics

  • 4.1. Demand

  • 4.2. Technological opportunity

  • 4.3. Appropriability

  • 5. Conclusion

  • Acknowledgments

  • References

  • Part II: Invention and innovation

  • Chapter 5: The Economics of Science

  • 1. Introduction

  • 2. The public nature of knowledge and the reward structure of science

  • 2.1. The importance of priority

  • 2.2. Financial remuneration and the satisfaction derived from solving the puzzle

  • 3. How knowledge is produced

  • 3.1. Time and cognitive inputs

  • 3.2. Research resources

  • 3.3. Serendipity

  • 4. Choice of scientific contests and character of research

  • 4.1. Choice of contests

  • 4.2. The character of research

  • 4.3. Production of dual knowledge

  • 5. Outcomes

  • 5.1. Is science a young person’s game?

  • 5.1.1. Age and publishing

  • 5.1.2. Age and exceptional contributions

  • 5.1.3. Age and patenting

  • 5.2. The presence of cohort effects

  • 5.3. Gender

  • 5.4. Inequality

  • 6. Efficiency considerations and funding regimes

  • 6.1. Efficient nature of the reward system

  • 6.2. Funding regimes

  • 6.3. Are there too many contestants in certain contests?

  • 6.4. The incentive to share knowledge in a timely fashion

  • 7. Scientists in industry

  • 8. Scientific labor markets

  • 8.1. A description of scientific labor markets

  • 8.1.1. Where they train

  • 8.1.2. Where they work

  • 8.1.3. International mobility patterns

  • 8.2. Studies of supply and demand for new entrants to science

  • 8.3. Forecasting scientific labor markets

  • 9. Science, productivity, and the new growth economics

  • 10. Conclusion

  • Acknowledgments

  • References

  • Chapter 6: University Research and Public-Private Interaction

  • 1. Introduction

  • 2. Government laboratories and research universities: Two different public research organizations

  • 3. A conceptual approach to the problem of managing complementarities between universities´ and industry's research

  • 3.1. Economic opportunities

  • 3.2. Institutional obstacles

  • 3.2.1. On rewards, spillovers, and the distribution of IP

  • 3.2.2. On cognitive focus, mental mobilization, and time horizon

  • 3.2.3. On the allocation of resource: Faculty’s time and effort

  • 3.2.4. Dilemmas

  • 3.3. Structural factors for managing complementarities

  • 3.3.1. The role of engineering sciences

  • 3.3.2. New managerial practices in industry

  • 3.3.3. Bridging institutions

  • 4. The empirical literature: Issues and results

  • 4.1. From university to industry: The quest for “relevant knowledge”

  • 4.1.1. Evidence from innovation surveys

  • 4.1.2. Patent data and innovation counts: The “knowledge spillover” approach20

  • 4.2. Universities in the market place

  • 4.2.1. Academic patenting

  • 4.2.2. Academic entrepreneurship28

  • 4.3. From industry to university: Individual and system level interactions

  • 4.3.1. Scientific productivity of academic inventors and industry-sponsored researchers

  • 4.3.2. The anticommons hypothesis

  • 4.4. Bridging institutions

  • 5. Policy issues and open questions

  • 5.1. Academics in the market place: Overcoming the dilemmas

  • 5.2. Manipulating incentives: From a “by-product economy” to a “joint product economy”

  • 5.3. Directions for future research

  • References

  • Chapter 7: Property Rights and Invention

  • 1. Introduction

  • 2. Brief sketch of the patent right

  • 2.1. What is a patent?

  • 2.2. Patent agreements and administration

  • 2.3. Enforcement

  • 2.4. Summary

  • 3. Economic interpretation of the patent process

  • 3.1. Interpreting the goal(s) of patent policy

  • 3.2. The reward and contract theories of patents

  • 4. Incentives to innovate in the absence of intellectual property protection

  • 5. Optimal patent design: Length and breadth of protection

  • 5.1. Single-innovation models

  • 5.2. Cumulative innovation models

  • 5.3. Complementary innovation

  • 5.4. Disclosure issues

  • 5.5. Alternatives to a patent system: Optimal procurement of innovation

  • 6. How is the right secured? Enforcement

  • 7. Patent rights and competition policy

  • 8. Conclusions

  • References

  • Chapter 8: Stylized Facts in the Geography of Innovation

  • 1. Introduction

  • 2. Stylized facts surrounding the geography of innovation: A road map

  • 2.1. Innovation is spatially concentrated

  • 2.2. Geography provides a platform to organize innovative activity

  • 2.3. Places are not equal: Urbanization, localization, and diversity

  • 2.4. Knowledge spillovers are geographically localized

  • 2.5. Knowledge spillovers are nuanced, subtle, pervasive, and not easily amenable to measurement

  • 2.6. Local universities are necessary but not sufficient for innovation

  • 2.7. Innovation benefits from local buzz and global pipelines

  • 2.8. Places are defined over time by an evolutionary process

  • 3. Conclusions

  • Acknowledgments

  • References

  • Chapter 9: Open User Innovation

  • 1. Importance of innovation by users

  • 2. Why many users want custom products

  • 3. Users´ innovate-or-buy decisions

  • 4. Users´ low-cost innovation niches

  • 5. Why users often freely reveal their innovations

  • 6. Innovation communities

  • 7. Adapting policy to user innovation

  • 8. Diffusion of user-developed innovations

  • 9. Summary

  • References

  • Chapter 10: Learning by Doing

  • 1. Introduction

  • 2. Microeconomic implications of passive learning

  • 2.1. Pricing and output decisions

  • 2.2. Cost functions and price-taking behavior

  • 2.3. Endogenous heterogeneity

  • 2.4. Learning and industry concentration

  • 2.5. Strategic implications of learning

  • 2.5.1. Fixed numbers of firms

  • 2.5.2. Predation and entry deterrence

  • 2.6. Alternative specifications of learning

  • 2.6.1. Spillovers

  • 2.6.2. Learning as a function of cumulated investment

  • 2.6.3. Learning as a function of time

  • 2.6.4. Forgetting

  • 3. Empirical evidence

  • 3.1. Large sample evidence

  • 3.2. Individual learning by doing

  • 3.3. Case study evidence

  • 3.3.1. Omitted variables

  • 3.3.2. Institutional complexities: The upper weave room of Lawrence Company Mill No. 2, Lowell, MA

  • 4. Models of passive learning

  • 4.1. Models with unbounded learning

  • 4.2. Models with bounded learning

  • 4.2.1. Two simple models

  • 4.2.2. Bayesian models

  • 4.2.3. Empirical discrimination

  • 5. Passive learning and aggregate growth

  • 5.1. A simple model

  • 5.2. Hybrid models

  • 5.2.1. Growth independent of the rate of learning

  • 5.2.2. Growth increasing in the rate of learning

  • 5.2.3. Stagnation independent of the rate of learning

  • 5.2.4. Stagnation induced by learning

  • 5.2.5. Clusters and cycles induced by learning

  • 6. Concluding remarks

  • References

  • Chapter 11: Innovative Conduct in Computing and Internet Markets

  • 1. Introduction and overview

  • 2. Innovation in commercial computing

  • 2.1. Stretching the technological frontier and technology push

  • 2.2. Computing as a GPT

  • 2.3. Coinvention costs and creating value from GPTs

  • 2.4. Platform competition shapes economic incentives

  • 2.5. Innovation within and between platforms

  • 2.6. Divided technical leadership and innovation conduct

  • 2.7. Racing and persistence by incumbent and entrepreneurial entrants

  • 2.8. Economic experiments and market-based learning

  • 2.9. Economic experiments with learning externalities

  • 2.10. Localization of innovative activity in computing

  • 3. The commercial Internet in the United States

  • 3.1. Stretching the frontier prior to commercialization

  • 3.2. Learning externalities and commercialization

  • 3.3. Localization and commercialization of Internet software production

  • 3.4. Platform development for the commercial Internet

  • 3.5. New forms of organizations to coordinate firm conduct

  • 3.6. Diffusion of the commercial Internet

  • 3.7. Coinvention and business processes for Internet technologies

  • 3.8. Unending economic experimentation

  • 3.9. Continuity and change in innovative conduct

  • 3.10. Economic conduct: Open questions

  • Acknowledgments

  • References

  • Chapter 12: Pharmaceutical Innovation

  • 1. Introduction

  • 2. Time phases

  • 3. Changing discovery methods

  • 4. Industry–academic science links

  • 5. Clinical testing costs and regulation

  • 6. The decision-theoretic problem

  • 7. Uncertainty revisited

  • 8. The unique role of patents

  • 9. Profitability and research investments

  • 10. Implications for economic welfare

  • 11. Developing new drugs and vaccines for third world diseases

  • 12. Conclusion

  • Acknowledgments

  • References

  • Chapter 13: Collective Invention and Inventor Networks

  • 1. Introduction

  • 2. The stock of knowledge has grown

  • 3. The sources of knowledge have become more diverse

  • 3.1. Costs of establishing knowledge access

  • 3.2. Geographic dispersion of knowledge and collective invention

  • 3.3. Collective knowledge versus competing artifacts?

  • 4. New forms of governance facilitate collective invention

  • 5. Interindustry heterogeneity

  • 5.1. Nature and relevance of collective knowledge

  • 5.2. The interorganizational decomposability of problems

  • 5.3. Feasibility of individual versus collective appropriability

  • 6. Conclusion

  • References

  • Part III: Commercialization of Innovation

  • Chapter 14: The Financing of R&D and Innovation

  • 1. Introduction

  • 2. R&D as investment

  • 3. Theoretical background

  • 3.1. Asymmetric information problems

  • 3.2. Moral hazard problems

  • 3.3. Capital structure and R&D

  • 3.4. Taxes and the source of funds

  • 4. Testing for financial constraints

  • 5. Small firms, startup finance, and venture capital

  • 5.1. Venture investing

  • 5.2. Exiting

  • 5.3. Venture fund raising

  • 5.4. The globalization of venture capital

  • 5.5. The real effects of venture capital

  • 5.6. Government funding for startup firms

  • 6. Conclusions

  • Acknowledgments

  • References

  • Chapter 15: The Market for Technology

  • 1. Introduction

  • 2. The market for technology: Definition and scope of our analysis

  • 3. The microfoundations: Why do companies license?

  • 3.1. Gains from trade

  • 3.2. Supply: Determinants of technology licensing

  • 3.2.1. Licensing revenue versus rent-dissipation effects

  • 3.2.2. Licensing decisions in the long-run

  • 3.3. Demand

  • 3.3.1. Absorptive capacity

  • 3.3.2. Internal R&D and the demand for technology: Other considerat

  • 4. The size of the market for technology

  • 4.1. The world market for technology since the mid-1990s

  • 4.2. Firm-level evidence

  • 5. Factors that condition the market for technology

  • 5.1. Cognitive limitations

  • 5.2. Contractual limitations

  • 5.2.1. Asymmetric information and the market for lemons

  • 5.3. Patents and the market for technology

  • 5.3.1. The problem with patents

  • 5.3.2. Patents and nonmarket institutions for technology flows

  • 5.4. Contracting for technology without patents

  • 5.5. The structure of licensing contracts

  • 6. Consequences of the existence of markets for technology

  • 6.1. The division of innovative labor

  • 6.2. Entry and competition upstream and downstream

  • 6.3. The rise and decline and the rise once again?

  • 7. Conclusions and avenues for further research

  • References

  • Chapter 16: Technological Innovation and the Theory of the Firm: The Role of Enterprise-Level Knowledge, Complementarities, and (Dynamic) Capabilities

  • 1. Introduction

  • 2. The organization and environment of enterprise-level R&D

  • 3. The innovating firm in context

  • 3.1. The ecosystem for innovation

  • 3.2. Market structure as a determinant of innovation

  • 3.3. The technological environment

  • 4. Resources, competences, and dynamic capabilities

  • 4.1. Resources/competences

  • 4.2. Resources/competences, “strategic” assets, and price theory

  • 4.3. Dynamic capabilities

  • 5. A dynamic capabilities view of the firm

  • 5.1. General

  • 5.2. Innovation and change

  • 5.3. Creating value with innovation

  • 5.4. Capturing value (profiting) from innovation

  • 5.5. The profiting from innovation framework

  • 6. Innovation and internal structure/management

  • 6.1. General considerations

  • 6.2. Literati, numerati, and entrepreneurs

  • 6.3. Teams

  • 6.4. Hierarchy

  • 6.5. Incentive systems

  • 7. Towards a theory of the innovating firm

  • 7.1. Context

  • 7.2. Dynamic capabilities, cospecialization, and transaction costs

  • 7.3. The boundaries of the innovating firm

  • 7.3.1. General

  • 7.3.2. Capabilities, complementary assets, and intellectual property

  • 7.3.3. Opportunity “management”

  • 7.3.4. Coordination of complementary assets and systems integration

  • 7.4. The fundamental economic “problems” to be solved by the (innovating) firm

  • 7.5. Recapping complementarities, cospecialization, and the scope of the (innovating) firm

  • 7.6. The “nature” of the innovating firm

  • 8. Conclusion

  • Acknowledgments

  • References

  • Author Index of Volumes 1 and 2

  • Subject Index of Volumes 1 and 2

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